The European Union faces a diplomatic problem that extends beyond who participates in negotiations to end the war in Ukraine. It concerns whether Europe can turn its collective political and economic weight into a coherent foreign policy while decisions about the continent’s security are discussed through several channels. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s criticism has brought this weakness into focus. Her intervention is not merely a complaint about Italy’s exclusion from meetings. It challenges the Union to establish a common position and ensure that its interests are reflected in any settlement.
In her letter to European Council President António Costa, Meloni argued that the proliferation of diplomatic formats was creating an impression of disunity. Meetings in Miami and Oslo, discussions involving the Coalition of the Willing and the European Political Community, and direct communication between European leaders and Russian President Vladimir Putin have added to a complicated negotiating landscape. Each initiative may have its own purpose, but without a framework connecting them to a common strategy, Europe risks creating a gap between its ambitions and its ability to deliver.
The timing is significant. Diplomatic activity has expanded to include the United States, Ukraine, Britain, France, Germany, NATO and EU institutions. The E3 grouping of Britain, France and Germany has become prominent, while other governments participate through different arrangements. The European Commission and NATO also have distinct roles. These channels need not conflict, but uncertainty over their responsibilities makes it difficult to identify who can communicate a position agreed by the Union.
Developments in the first week of November have underlined the stakes. On November 4, the European Commission hosted representatives from Ukraine, the United States, France, Germany, Britain, NATO and the World Bank to discuss a proposed prosperity plan and security guarantees. NATO also hosted discussions involving European and American representatives, while Washington announced US mediated talks between Ukrainian and Russian delegations in Abu Dhabi on November 10 and 11. These discussions concern the end of hostilities as well as the security and economic arrangements shaping Ukraine’s future. Europe cannot remain uncertain about how its interests are represented.
Meloni’s central concern is that overlapping initiatives can weaken European influence. Diplomatic engagement is valuable when it expands communication and creates opportunities for compromise. It becomes less effective when participants convey different priorities without agreed objectives. Negotiating counterparts may receive inconsistent signals on sanctions, security guarantees, territorial questions or the conditions for a settlement. Unity does not require identical views, but it does require a mechanism for reconciling differences before Europe presents its position.
The consequences of a settlement will reach far beyond the battlefield. Ukraine’s territorial integrity, future defence arrangements and relationship with Western institutions will shape the wider European security order. Governments must consider the risk of renewed Russian aggression, the credibility of security guarantees and the long term costs of sustaining Ukraine’s stability. If Europe expects to shoulder substantial financial, military and reconstruction responsibilities, its political concerns must also be heard when settlement terms are discussed.
Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski’s support for Meloni suggests that the concern extends beyond Rome. He argued that Europe needed legitimate representation because European countries were paying for the consequences of the war, and stressed that Eastern European and Scandinavian states should be included. His preference for the framework established by the Lisbon Treaty reflects the view that representation should rest on recognised institutional authority rather than informal arrangements among a limited group. This matters particularly to states closer to Russia, whose security calculations may differ from those further west.
The Lisbon Treaty provides a framework for coordinated European foreign policy, but legal provisions alone cannot resolve political disagreements. EU foreign policy depends on cooperation among member states, which retain their own interests and diplomatic relationships. A special envoy would need a defined mandate, regular consultation with national governments and authority to communicate positions they have agreed. Without these conditions, the appointment could simply add another participant to an already crowded process.
Meloni has repeatedly advocated a special envoy for Russia and Ukraine peace negotiations. She first publicly raised the proposal in January, and Italian officials have continued to press it during European discussions. Her latest letter asks Costa to place the issue on the agenda of the informal European Council meeting in Dublin on November 13. She has also urged leaders to reach a decision at the December European Council, following consultations with Britain, Norway and other relevant partners. The proposal now has a timetable, but its success depends on agreement over the representative’s authority and responsibilities.
Costa’s response indicates that the issue has received institutional attention. He thanked Meloni for setting out her concerns and agreed that European participation must convey a clear and unified message, defend the Union’s interests and support Ukraine. His insistence that the Union be represented through its institutions and in accordance with the treaties places the debate within the existing structure. Yet agreement on unity is not agreement on the person, mandate or practical arrangements needed to achieve it.
The relationship between the EU and the United Kingdom presents another challenge. Britain is no longer a member of the Union, but remains a major European security actor and part of the E3. Norway, also outside the EU, has participated in discussions alongside European partners. Meloni’s proposal to consult both recognises that the war’s security consequences extend beyond the Union’s boundaries. An approach excluding important partners outside the EU could be incomplete, but the EU must preserve a distinct institutional voice so that its common interests are not diluted in broader groupings.
The prominence of the E3 exposes the balance between diplomatic efficiency and political legitimacy. A smaller group can coordinate quickly and engage directly with major powers. France, Germany and Britain have significant diplomatic and military capabilities, making their involvement understandable. But a settlement will affect more than these countries. Poland, the Baltic states, Finland, Sweden, Italy and others have legitimate security concerns. If decisions are shaped mainly by a narrow group, other states may question whether their interests have been considered, weakening the common position Europe is trying to establish.
Italy’s experience gives Meloni’s intervention an immediate political context. Rome was excluded from the Miami discussions in October and the Brussels meetings this week, although it took part in Oslo at Norway’s invitation. An Italian national security adviser attended a working dinner there in place of France, rather than as an additional participant. Meloni nevertheless stated that she was not seeking a seat for Italy in a particular format. Her stated concern is whether the Union itself has an authorised representative, not simply whether Rome receives access to individual meetings.
Italy’s exclusion has nevertheless exposed the limits of its influence within the emerging diplomatic structure. Meloni may see a common EU representative as a way to prevent the wider membership from being marginalised by a smaller group. That does not invalidate her argument, but it makes a transparent selection process essential. Member states must regard the representative as speaking for the Union rather than advancing the priorities of one government or coalition.
Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov’s comments on November 6 demonstrated that the question is visible beyond Brussels. He said Europe would eventually need to participate in discussions about security guarantees and the wider European security system, while criticising the difficulty European governments have faced in deciding who could represent them. Moscow’s position should not be mistaken for support for European interests. Nevertheless, if the Union cannot establish a recognised channel for communicating its position, others may shape the diplomatic framework without meaningful European input.
Ukraine’s concerns make coherent European participation even more important. A settlement cannot be judged only by whether it produces an immediate reduction in fighting. Its durability will depend on credible protection against renewed aggression and on preserving Ukraine’s ability to determine its future. Recent discussions have included security guarantees and reconstruction, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has pressed Western partners to make postwar commitments clear and practical. European governments will be central to implementing many of these arrangements. Their inability to coordinate during negotiations would raise doubts about their capacity to sustain commitments afterwards.
The Dublin meeting on November 13 offers an opportunity to move beyond general statements about unity. The December deadline proposed by Meloni could provide a route towards a formal decision. Governments will have to accept a common mandate and recognise that coordination requires compromise. A representative cannot speak effectively for Europe if every capital reserves the right to issue a separate position whenever negotiations become politically difficult. Differences should be managed through consultation rather than allowed to undermine the collective position.
Meloni’s intervention has exposed a weakness European leaders can no longer dismiss as a procedural inconvenience. The issue is not which country deserves greater visibility, but whether the Union can represent its members collectively while remaining connected to Ukraine and other European security partners. A common voice will not guarantee a favourable settlement or resolve the differences between Moscow and Kyiv. It can prevent Europe from weakening its position through avoidable confusion. If the Dublin and December meetings produce only another declaration of unity, the problem will remain. Europe needs an agreed representative, a clear mandate and the political discipline to stand behind both.