According to my first hand experience of the emerging pole of the so called multipolar world order, I have found this new pole very interesting, but not necessarily for the reasons its supporters would like. What immediately stands out is its apparent zero tolerance towards disagreement. It can be remarkably quick to react to criticism, extraordinarily sensitive to independent positions and even quicker to consider retaliatory measures when another country, institution or individual refuses to agree with its preferred position.
What makes this particularly interesting is that this behaviour appears to contradict the very principles that are repeatedly presented as the foundation of multipolarity. A multipolar world is supposed to provide countries with greater strategic independence, sovereign decision making and freedom from the dominance of any single power. Yet if the emergence of a new pole means that countries within its geographical or political sphere are expected to agree with it, support its positions and avoid criticism, then what exactly has changed? The centre of power may have changed, but the underlying behaviour of power politics remains remarkably similar.
The problem becomes even more visible when disagreement is treated as hostility. There is a fundamental difference between opposing a country’s policy and opposing the country itself. There is also a difference between maintaining neutrality and taking an opposing position. A state can refuse to participate in another state’s strategic agenda without becoming its enemy. A citizen can criticise a government without becoming an agent of a foreign power. A media organisation can question a geopolitical narrative without becoming part of an opposing bloc. These distinctions appear increasingly important in an international environment where political loyalty is sometimes being demanded almost as a condition of maintaining normal relations.
The retaliatory instinct is perhaps the most concerning part. When criticism or noncompliance is followed almost immediately by diplomatic pressure, economic measures, political threats, public denunciations or other forms of retaliation, it raises a basic question about the confidence of the emerging power. A genuinely confident geopolitical actor should be capable of tolerating criticism without feeling compelled to punish every disagreement. The faster a power moves from disagreement to retaliation, the more it risks revealing insecurity rather than strength.
There is also something deeply contradictory about demanding sovereignty for oneself while attempting to influence or dictate the choices of others. Many of these emerging powers have built their international arguments around the principle that no external actor should interfere in their domestic affairs or dictate their foreign policy. That principle is legitimate. But sovereignty cannot operate in only one direction. If a country demands the right to make its own choices, it must also accept that neighbouring countries, smaller states, political institutions and individual citizens possess the same right.
This is where my experience of this emerging pole becomes particularly striking. It sometimes feels less like the creation of a genuinely plural multipolar system and more like a group of dictators who, after spending years dictating the political direction of their own nations, are now attempting to dictate the direction of an entire region in the name of multipolarity. The geography may be larger and the rhetoric may be different, but the instinct can remain the same: agreement is welcomed, disagreement is questioned and resistance is treated as something that must be corrected.
That is not the multipolarity I understand.
Multipolarity should not mean that the world is divided into several powerful camps, each demanding obedience from countries within its sphere. It should mean that several centres of power exist while countries retain the freedom to cooperate with one, several or none of them according to their own national interests. A country should be able to maintain relations with one power while cooperating with another, without being pressured to choose sides or surrender its independent foreign policy. It should be able to work with a regional power while criticising its policies. It should be able to remain neutral during a geopolitical confrontation without being accused of betrayal.
The same principle must apply to citizens and independent institutions. If a political system claims to represent a new international model, it should not require its citizens to continuously demonstrate agreement with the state or its geopolitical narrative. A healthy political environment does not eliminate disagreement. It absorbs disagreement. It does not treat criticism as an existential threat. It uses criticism to identify weaknesses, correct mistakes and improve policy.
The emerging pole therefore has a basic lesson to learn before it can genuinely claim to offer an alternative world order: tolerance is not a concession to weakness. It is an essential component of strength. A powerful state should be able to hear criticism without immediately reaching for retaliation. A regional power should be able to tolerate a neighbouring country’s independent position. A government should be able to distinguish between an opponent and a critic. And a geopolitical bloc should be able to accept that not every country will automatically follow its strategic preferences.
Otherwise, the irony becomes difficult to escape. A system created in opposition to domination could itself become another mechanism of domination. The rhetoric may change from unipolarity to multipolarity, from Western hegemony to sovereign equality and from alliance politics to strategic autonomy. But if the practical expectation remains that weaker countries must follow stronger ones, then the world has not really escaped the politics of hierarchy. It has simply created several competing hierarchies.
If this pole of dictators really wants to be established and thrive, then it must first learn the most basic lesson of political and international maturity: it must learn to tolerate disagreement, accept criticism and respect independent choices. It must understand that ignoring its presence is not an act of aggression, refusing to agree with it is not an act of hostility and criticising its policies is not necessarily an attempt to undermine it.
The strength of a new geopolitical order will not be measured by how quickly it can threaten those who disagree with it. It will be measured by how confidently it can allow them to disagree.
If the emerging multipolar world cannot tolerate independent voices, then it risks proving one uncomfortable point: perhaps it is not creating a new world order at all. Perhaps it is simply creating new centres of power that have learned to speak the language of multipolarity while practising the politics of domination.