NPT: Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
National statement delivered by State Secretary Eivind Vad Petersson
President,
Congratulations on your election.
By 1967, five states had developed nuclear weapons, with projections suggesting twenty-five by the mid-1970s. Six decades later, that number remains in the single digits. Arsenals were eventually reduced, and nuclear weapons not used again. Meanwhile, nuclear science and technology have been developed for peaceful purposes, supporting health, agriculture, energy and more.
These outcomes were not inevitable. They resulted from political choices: common rules over unconstrained competition, verification over uncertainty, cooperation over resignation. At their core lies the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT has been foundational in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and enabling peaceful uses of nuclear technology. These objectives are interlinked. The right to peaceful uses is integral to the Treaty. Non-proliferation and development reinforce each other.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been central to this success. Through safeguards, capacity-building and international cooperation, it has helped make peaceful nuclear applications accessible in a safe, secure and responsible manner. Export controls have also played a key role, giving effect to non-proliferation obligations while enabling peaceful cooperation and development.
These achievements, however, cannot be taken for granted.
President,
We stand at the threshold of a new nuclear age. Reductions have stalled. Bilateral arms control has expired. New, destabilising delivery systems are emerging. Proliferation pressure increases, and risks are rising. Prime among the causes is Russia.
Russia’s brutal war of aggression and attempted territorial annexation of Ukraine continues into its fifth year, marked by persistent nuclear threats, weaponization of nuclear risks, and violations of negative security guarantees. Three years ago Russia invalidly suspended its New START-obligations.
Meanwhile, the DPRK continues its illegal nuclear- and missile programmes, and Iran has enriched uranium to levels with no credible civilian justification.
China’s hasty nuclear buildup threatens a new arms race. Unwilling to acknowledge this expansion, China avoids open debate, while more transparent states are exposed to scrutiny.
In response, rearmament has returned to the policy agenda of others.
President,
The situation is dire. Resignation, however, is not an option. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences threatened by nuclear weapons are simply too grave.
Article VI commits us to the goal of a nuclear-weapon free world. All Nuclear-Weapon States must step up their efforts, with the largest possessors bearing a special responsibility. We call on China, Russia and the United States to lead meaningful initiatives toward mutual, verifiable, and irreversible disarmament, and we welcome the United States’ proposal for a multilateral arms control-process.
We need political will and commitment, not attempts to deflect attention through unfounded claims against NATO’s extended deterrence, which predates the NPT and was essential to its very feasibility.
Let me conclude by highlighting five issues.
First: Risk reduction. Soaring nuclear risks threaten us all. Measures are needed so they do not materialise as we pursue disarmament.
Second: Transparency, accountability and a strengthened review process. Transparency is essential for confidence and progress. Reporting by Nuclear Weapon States remains uneven. We need greater detail, and a system for structured engagement.
Third: Past Conferences identified three essential principles for nuclear disarmament: transparency, verification and irreversibility. Developing these principles brings us closer to disarmament. Verification and irreversibility have advanced in this cycle. We call for continued support for this work.
Fourth: The right to peaceful uses must be reinforced. The IAEA is key. As nuclear energy and proliferation-sensitive technologies expand, the Agency needs adequate and sustainable resources for safeguards and supporting states in building safe, secure and sustainable nuclear infrastructure.
Fifth: The Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the moratoria, are essential for non-proliferation and disarmament, and deserve the Conference’s support.
President,
The NPT is a bedrock of our collective security and prosperity. We are here to protect and progress it.
Thank you
: Norway in the UN